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Abstract
In June 2016, the European Commission issued a new EU Blue Card proposal. The
new proposal is meant to make the EU more attractive for highly qualified workers from
third countries. While aimed at strengthening the knowledge-based economy of the EU,
the potential impacts of the new Blue Card proposal on less developed sending countries
raise a number of questions. The present study attempts to shed light on potential
challenges and opportunities by analysing the impacts of the new EU Blue Card proposal
on the knowledge-based capital in sending countries – as one of the main drivers of the
economic growth. Our results suggest that the EU Blue Card may reduce the knowledge-
based capital, and hence growth and development prospects in less developed sending
countries if not accompanied by appropriate policy measures. Examining a number of
alternative policy measures, which could help turning the sending country challenges
into opportunities, our results suggest that policies implemented on the demand side
of the sending country labour market are more efficient than policies that address the
supply side of the labour market, though they are less costly to implement.
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1. Introduction
In 2009 the EU introduced a new policy instrument to manage the legal migration –
the EU Blue Card – that should facilitate the entry, employment and residence of highly
skilled third country nationals in the EU. The first review report of the EU Blue Card,
concluded by the European Commission in May 2014 revealed a number of deficiencies,
such as, a relatively low uptake level. In light of rather unsatisfactory results since its
introduction, the Commission’s President Jean Claude Juncker stressed the need to revise
the EU Blue Card Directive to make it more effective in attracting talent to Europe:1
"I want to promote a new European policy on legal migration. Such a policy could
help us to address shortages of specific skills and attract talent to better cope with the
demographic challenges of the European Union. [...] As a first step, I intend to review
the “Blue Card” legislation and its unsatisfactory state of implementation."
In order to address the identified shortcomings in the EU Blue Card implementation,
in June 2016 the European Commission issued a new EU Blue Card proposal, which
includes, inter alia, less stringent admission criteria, such as lower salary thresholds
and shorter length of work contracts, better family reunification conditions, facilitated
mobility and the abolition of parallel national schemes. This new proposal, which is
currently being negotiated, is meant to make the EU Blue Card more attractive for
highly qualified workers from third countries and increase the inflows of skilled workers
(European Commission 2016).
While certainly strengthening the knowledge-based economy of the EU, the potential
impacts of the new Blue Card proposal on less developed sending countries raise many
questions. For example, what will be the long-term impacts of the new EU Blue Card
proposal on the knowledge-based capital and economic growth in sending countries?
What are possible policy actions to tackle challenges and utilise opportunities associated
with the revised EU Blue Card to ensure a win-win situation for both receiving and
sending countries?
There is a growing body of literature studying the potential implications of the
EU Blue Card scheme, most of them focusing at impacts on the labour market and
economic growth (e.g. Gumus 2010; Parkes and Angenendt 2010; Cerna 2013; Eisele 2013).
Typically, these studies find that the skilled labour attracted to the EU will boost the
1http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker-political-guidelines.pdf
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global competitiveness and the economic growth in the medium- to long-run. However,
Blue Card impacts on less developed sending countries have been studied much less
(Lucas 2004, 2015), although, as noted above, the EU Blue Card may pose important
challenges to less developed sending countries, if not addressed appropriately by policy
makers. For example, the Blue Card may increase the brain drain from less developed
sending countries and reduce the human capital, which is one of the main sources of the
knowledge-based capital and hence the economic growth (Andrews and Criscuolo 2013).
The main objective of the present study is to fill this research gap by assessing the
potential impacts of the new EU Blue Card proposal on the knowledge-based capital – a
key source of the economic growth – in less developed sending countries and, based on
gained insights, to identify and examine appropriate policy instruments for dealing with
potential challenges and opportunities triggered by the EU Blue Card. Given that the
knowledge-based capital is one of the main sources of the economic growth (Andrews and
Criscuolo 2013), which in turn depends crucially on the size of the skilled workforce in
country (De la Fuente and Ciccone 2002), in this study we analyse how the EU Blue Card
might affect the key ingredients of the knowledge-based capital in sending countries.
In particular, we focus on the human capital and knowledge stock, as in the previous
literature they are identified as key components of the knowledge-based capital (OECD
2013). Whereas the former is determined by investment into the human capital e.g.
through education and by the international labour migration, the latter depends on the
investment into the R&D and innovation and on the diffusion and absorption of ideas
and knowledge generated somewhere else. Both are investigated in the present study.
Our investigation is based on a conceptual analysis, which has several advantages
compared to numerical simulations.2 First, the main objective of the present study is to
identify and explain the key channels of adjustment in the knowledge-based capital in
an intuitive way, rather than to produce concrete numbers. Second, given that due to
the short implementation period and the rather low uptake so far the available historical
data for an empirical analysis are not sufficient yet, we believe that for policy makers the
adopted conceptual analysis is more insightful and makes our findings more practically
applicable.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we analyse how the EU
Blue Card and the associated skilled labour migration affects important determinants
2For numerical simulations of labour migration impacts in the EU see Ciaian and Kancs (2016); Kielyte
(2016); and Kancs and Lecca (2016).
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of knowledge-based capital in less developed sending countries: skilled labour force,
international migration of skilled workers, domestic knowledge accumulation, and
international knowledge flows. Section 3 identifies and examines policy options for less
developed sending countries in order to address the potential challenges arising from the
skilled labour emigration. The final Section draws concluding remarks.
2. The impact of the EU Blue Card on the knowledge-based capital in LDC3
According to the new EU Blue Card (BC) proposal, it will improve access to skilled jobs
in the EU and reduce migration costs, which in the short-run will widen the net wage gap
between EU and less developed sending countries (LDC). Increased net of migration cost
wage differences will reinforce the migration of skilled workers from LDC to EU. In the
long-run, in addition to these direct labour migration effects, migration will also induce
adjustments in the stock and accumulation of the knowledge-based capital (knowledge
stock and human capital). In this section we analyse how BC might affect the key sources
of the knowledge-based capital in LDC: the human capital accumulation through the
workforce education, the long-run migration and the inter-regional distribution of the
skilled workforce, the domestic knowledge accumulation through R&D and international
knowledge diffusion.
2.1. BC impact on the human capital accumulation in LDC
BC will affect the long-run education equilibrium, which determines the share of the
educated workforce, through several channels. According to Ciaian and Kancs (2007), the
four most important ones are changes in the skilled/unskilled wage ratio in LDC, the
job and skill upgrading effect in EU, higher education cost per worker, and remittance-
induced changes in the worker income and liquidity constraints.
First, through the skilled worker emigration, BC will induce changes in relative
skilled-unskilled wages in LDC, which in turn will affect education incentives. Given
that under BC only skilled workers will be able to migrate, the ratio of skilled/unskilled
workers will decrease in LDC, at least in the short-run. Everything else equal, a declining
supply of the skilled workforce will exert an upward pressure on the skilled wage. As a
result, an increased skilled/unskilled wage gap will induce additional unskilled workers
to obtain skills through education. Thus, through changes in the skilled /unskilled wage
3See Appendix for a formal analysis.
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ratio in LDC, the sending country’s wage effect will increase the long-run education
equilibrium in LDC.
Second, through the job and skill upgrading, BC will increase the average earnings
of skilled migrants in EU, which will affect worker education decisions in LDC. The
empirical evidence from European destination countries suggests that in the absence of
BC only a small part of highly skilled immigrants from LDC are employed in skilled jobs
(Salt 1997). The majority of skilled migrants from LDC work in sectors and jobs requiring
little qualification, such as agriculture, transport or construction. BC will stop the brain
waste by allowing skilled migrants from LDC to work in skilled jobs in EU. This will
increase their wage to the EU skilled wage, implying that the incentives for eduction and
migration will be considerably higher under BC in LDC. Thus, because of higher wages
that migrants from LDC will receive in EU, emigration incentives will increase. Further,
the skilled wage will increase also in LDC, which in turn will increase the education
equilibrium in LDC.
Third, being a skill-biased policy instrument, BC will increase the average education
cost per worker and hence decrease the share of the educated workforce. It is well known
that people are not equally talented, they are heterogeneous in their abilities. In the
presence of positive education costs, only most talented individuals obtain education
(Willis and Rosen 1979, Cameron and Heckman 1998). More precisely, only those workers
enter education, whose post-education productivity is sufficiently high to cover the fixed
cost of schooling. Hence, those workers which were unskilled before the introduction
of BC, have not only less skills, but, on average, they are also less talented than those
workers who have first obtained education. Education is more costly for the remaining
workforce (because on average it is less talented and less productive). Given that in terms
of productivity gains the education cost per one less talented worker is higher than per
one more talented worker, there will be less human capital at each given skilled/unskilled
wage gap.
Finally, BC will affect the education equilibrium in LDC also through remittances.
Depending on whether remittances are invested in education and whether workers
consider them as an additional stream of income, remittances may have either a positive
or negative impact on the education equilibrium in LDC. In both cases, changes would
be caused by rents, which emigrants receive in EU and, as other groups of migrants,
remit part to their families in LDC. Both remittance effects find support in the empirical
literature (Edwards and Ureta 2003; Chami et al. 2003). According to World Bank (2000),
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remittances of skilled migrants are more often spent on investment goods, e.g. fixed
assets and education, compared to unskilled worker remittances, which usually are spent
on consumption goods.4 Hence, BC remittances may move upward or remove completely
the liquidity constraint of education in LDC. As a result, more workers, particularly those
that were restrained from education by a binding liquidity constraint, may be able to
acquire skills through education (Carneiro and Heckman 2000, Cao 2008, Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner 2008). On the other hand, remittances may also have the opposite effect -
a decrease in the skill accumulation through education. Through the cash inflow via
remittances, BC increases the disposable worker income in LDC. Given that the labour
supply curve is U-shaped in the worker income, a higher total income may also reduce
the labour supply in LDC.
In summary, two BC effects will likely have a positive impact on the worker education
(increased skilled and unskilled wage ratio in LDC, and job and wage upgrading effect in
EU), one negative (increased education cost per worker), and one ambiguous (remittance-
induced changes in worker income and education costs), which implies that the total
impact of BC on the education equilibrium in LDC may be either positive or negative.
2.2. BC impact on the international labour migration
As noted above, in the short-run, through reduced migration costs and an improved
access to skilled jobs in EU, BC will increase the net of migration cost wage gap between
EU and LDC, and hence affect the international labour market equilibrium. The increased
wage difference will trigger the skilled worker migration – driven by higher expected
earnings in EU skilled workers will migrate from LDC to EU. In the long-run, in addition
to this direct short-run effect on the skilled labour force distribution between LDC and EU,
migration itself will affect determinants driving the labour migration, e.g. international
wage differences and migration costs. Both the direct brain drain effect and the induced
second-round migration effects – changes in relative wages in LDC and EU and changes
in migration costs – are examined next.5
4According to Cox (1987), skilled worker remittances differ from unskilled worker remittances in at least
two respects: quality and quantity. On the one hand, highly-skilled migrants remit less than unskilled
because skilled migrants are more likely to settle and to reunite with their family in EU. On the other hand,
in contrast to unskilled worker remittances, which are mostly spent for consumption goods, remittances of
skilled migrants are more often invested in production, fixed assets and education (World Bank 2000).
5In reality, there are many more forces at work. For example, the economic geography and urban
systems literature stress that because of agglomeration economies, firms in the larger region will be able to
pay higher wages attracting in such a way even more workers. We abstract from these effects, as they are
less pronounced at the international scale.
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The most direct and visible effect induced by BC will be the transfer of the human
capital embodied in the migrant labour – brain drain – from LDC to EU.6 Given that
skilled migrants embody private productive skills, the excludability character of the
human capital implies that the increase in the stock of the human capital in EU will
be proportional to a decrease in LDC. Thus, because of the brain drain, BC will have
a strictly negative impact on the human capital in LDC, everything else equal. On the
other hand, a series of recent studies (Mountford 1997; Vidal 1998; Beine et al. 2001; Beine
et al. 2008) suggest that the brain drain may ultimately contribute to the human capital
formation in sending countries. The main reason is that since the return to education is
higher abroad, migration prospects will raise the expected return to the human capital
and induce more people to invest in education at home. Under certain conditions, the
incentive effect (or brain gain) can dominate the brain drain effect, in which case there
would be a net gain for the source country (i.e., a beneficial brain drain). Sorger at
al. (2013) find that if the human capital formation is subject to a strong enough and
positive intertemporal externality and migration is sufficiently restrictive, the prospect of
migration may increase the human capital and hence the economic growth in sending
countries in the long-run.
In the long-run, the skilled worker migration will affect wages in LDC. By reducing
the skilled labour supply in LDC, the skilled worker emigration will exert an upward
pressure on wages in LDC (assuming that the labour demand does not change). This will
narrow the migration-driving wage gap between LDC and EU, implying less migration
in the long-run. Thus, because of the increasing skill premium in LDC, the long-run
losses of the human capital induced by BC may be lower compared to the short-run.
According to Borjas (1994), the international labour migration affects the wage rate
not only in sending countries but also in receiving countries. Through the increased
labour supply of skilled workers in EU, emigration will exert a downward pressure
on skilled wages in EU. A lower skilled/unskilled wage ratio in EU will narrow the
migration-driving wage gap between LDC and EU, which in turn will attract fewer Blue
Card migrants. Thus, because of a decreasing skill premium in EU, the long-run losses
of the human capital induced by BC may be lower compared to the short-run.
Both sending and receiving country wage effects will depend on the relative country
size and the size of the migrating population. The larger will be LDC, the bigger will be
6Given that the human capital embodied in skilled workers is draining out of country, in the migration
literature this effect is often referred to as a ’brain drain’.
6
the wage effect in EU, and the larger will be the share of the emigrating population, the
larger will be the wage effect in LDC. Analogously, if LDC would be small relative to
EU, then the labour migration would not affect (affects little) the skilled labour wage in
EU. Thus, the long-run losses of the human capital induced by BC may be lower in the
long-run compared to the short-run; and from a large LDC compared to a small LDC.
Finally, as other types of migrants, Blue Card holders will base their migration
decisions on net wage differences between EU and LDC, i.e. the gross wage difference
minus migration costs (Sjaastad 1962).7 Workers will migrate if the expected benefits arising
from migration are higher than migration costs. According to Carrington at al. (1996),
migration costs are decreasing in the migrant stock in the destination country. Declining
migration costs in turn will widen the net wage gap between LDC and EU, attracting
more skilled migrants. Thus, in the presence of migration networks and decreasing
migration costs, the impact of BC on the brain drain will be stronger than with constant
migration costs.
In summary, the direct brain drain effect will be magnified by decreasing migration
costs. On the other hand, adjustments in the skilled/unskilled wage ratio in LDC and EU
will reduce the direct brain drain effect on the human capital in LDC. These findings are
in line with the previous migration literature (Beine et al. 2001; Lowell and Findlay 2001;
Lucas 2004; Katseli et al. 2006). Depending on the relative strength of three induced supply
side effects, the size of the skilled work force migrating from LDC to EU can be either
higher or lower in the long-run compared to the short-run. In either case, it is important
for the migration policy planning to be aware of potentially sizeable differences between
the short-run and long-run migration and hence the impact of BC on the distribution of
the skilled workforce between LDC and EU. These results are supported by empirical
findings of Beine et al. (2008), who find that developing countries combining relatively
low levels of the human capital and low skilled worker emigration rates are more likely
to experience a beneficial brain drain (net positive effect) than conversely.
2.3. BC impact on R&D and innovation in LDC
BC will affect both the level and productivity of the knowledge production in LDC.
The two key determinants of public R&D activities is the budget size (government
revenue) and the budget share spent on R&D. Directly, BC will affect the size of the
7Migration costs include not only the physical relocation costs but also the employment uncertainty
(which is higher abroad than at home), social costs of leaving family and/or friends behind, cultural
adjustment costs etc.
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government budget which in turn will affect R&D investments and hence the knowledge
accumulation equilibrium. Indirectly, BC will also affect the structure of the government
budget. Through changes in the skilled labour force, BC may also affect the productivity
of the knowledge production.
First, through the emigration of skilled workers, BC will reduce the number of
taxpayers and hence the government tax revenue in LDC. Given that, on average, skilled
workers are higher net contributors than unskilled workers, the LDC government revenue
will decrease both due to fewer tax contributors and less taxpayers of high taxes.8 A
lower tax revenue will reduce the government expenditure on research and development.
On the other hand, a higher skilled/unskilled wage ratio (due to an upward pressure on
skilled wages) will increase the government tax revenue per skilled worker. Thus, because
of a smaller government budget but a larger budget per capita, the impact of BC might
be both reducing or increasing the R&D and the production of new knowledge. The total
impact of the government budget effect will depend on the size of the brain drain, the
spillover effect, the knowledge spillover effects, the unskilled labour productivity effect
and the remittance effect.
Second, the knowledge productivity in LDC will decrease because, after the introduction
of BC, part of the skilled labour from LDC will emigrate to EU, implying that fewer skilled
workers will be able to contribute to the production/absorption of knowledge in LDC.
As a result, the knowledge production & absorptive capacity in LDC will decrease (Cohen
and Levinthal 1990). On the other hand, BC will increase the knowledge productivity in
EU, because immigration will increase the stock of skilled labour in EU. Hence, LDC may
benefit only indirectly through a potentially higher knowledge production production in
EU and more intense knowledge spillovers.
In summary, both BC effects on R&D and innovation in LDC – quantity and quality
of innovation – will likely affect the knowledge stock in LDC negatively. The former
works through less government revenues and hence less public R&D expenditure. The
latter works though a decreasing knowledge production and absorption capacity, as less
skilled workers will be available in LDC.
8Because on average the wage rate for skilled work is higher than for unskilled and the unemployment
rate among skilled workers is lower, per capita, skilled workers contribute more to tax revenue than
unskilled workers.
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2.4. BC impact on the knowledge diffusion
The key channel through which the skilled labour migration affects knowledge
transmission barriers is the diaspora effect. The limiting effect of spatial barriers, such
as borders, language and distance, on knowledge spillovers has been confirmed both
nationally and internationally. E.g. Jaffe et al. (1993), Acs et al. (1994), and Audretsch and
Feldman (1996) find that knowledge spillovers are rather localised, and the cross-border
mobility of knowledge is limited. Peri (2003) reports that only fifteen percent of average
knowledge is learned outside the region of origin and only nine percent outside the
country of origin. Among others, the international trade and migration may help to
reduce the border effect of knowledge diffusion. Kapur (2001) argues that the skilled
worker migration facilitates the spillover of knowledge, and the diffusion of technology
and business contacts, by interacting as a carrier between the knowledge producing
country and the knowledge absorbing country. In the migration literature this effect is
known as the diaspora effect. Because of the diaspora effect, likely the skilled worker
migration induced by BC will reduce the barriers of EU’s knowledge flows to LDC and
increases the absorptive capacity. Thus, by reducing knowledge transmission barriers,
BC may increase productive inward knowledge spillovers.
In summary, the diaspora effect induced by BC will likely increase the inward
knowledge spillovers and reduce the cost of the foreign knowledge absorption. This
result finds strong support in the empirical literature (e.g. Kapur 2001).
3. Migration policy options for LDC
In light of the identified potential challenges, which the EU Blue Card may trigger, in
this section we review a number of migration policy options for LDC: migration tax, skill
subsidy, education subsidy, public R&D and innovation policies.
3.1. Migration tax
First, in order to compensate for BC-induced losses in the knowledge-based capital
and to reduce migration-driving international net wage differences between LDC and
EU, LDC government could impose a migration tax (Bhagwati tax) to emigrating skilled
workers (Bhagwati 1975). The migration tax would not affect non-migrating workers
in LDC. Instead, the migration tax would reduce the net skilled labour wage of LDC
migrant workers. Because of smaller net wage differences between LDC and EU, the
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number of migrants would decreases and the mass of skilled workers in LDC would
increase.9
Second, given that the Bhagwati tax requires an international cooperation between
LDC and EU, skilled worker incentives for making the use of BC could be reduced
by increasing the skilled wage in LDC, for example, by imposing a differentiated tax
rate for the skilled and unskilled labour. A skill-biased labour tax would affect only the
demand for the unskilled labour, the skilled labour demand would remain unaffected.
The skill-biased labour tax would reduce the net wage of the unskilled labour, incentives
for education would increase, resulting in a higher skilled worker emigration. A higher
emigration, in turn, would decreases the skilled labour wage. A lower skilled wage
would allow firms in LDC to hire more skilled workers. As a result, the size of the skilled
labour force in LDC and emigration to EU would increase.
In the above analysis we implicitly assumed that LDC is large enough to be able to
affect the international wage rate for the skilled labour. Only this indirect wage effect
may increase the skilled workforce in LDC. More precisely, by introducing a skill-biased
tax in LDC would depress the international skilled wage. If, however, LDC is sufficiently
small, then the LDC’s tax policy would not affect the international wage rate for the
skilled labour. As a result, both with and without taxation of the unskilled labour, the
stock of the skilled labour in small LDC would not be affected. However, in the presence
of BC, a skill-biased tax would increase emigration from LDC, which is due to a reduced
after-tax wage in LDC.
3.2. Skill subsidy
In order to compensate for BC-induced losses in the human capital, the LDC gov-
ernment could subsidise the skilled wage (Heckman 2000, Carneiro and Heckman 2003).
First, assume that LDC would pay the subsidy directly to skilled workers. The direct
skill subsidy would decrease the supply of the skilled labour. The demand for the skilled
labour, however, would not be affected. As a result, the wage rate for the skilled labour
would decrease. The size of the skilled work force in LDC would increase, because of the
indirect wage effect – the skilled wage would decrease. As a result, firms in LDC would
hire more skilled workers. However, if LDC is small enough, the international wage rate
for the skilled labour would not be affected. More skilled workers would have incentives
9If feasible, a migration quota/restriction would have a similar effect to the Bhagwati tax on the human
capital in LDC. The only difference is that the migration quota would not contribute to the government
budget.
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to migrate, because with the skill subsidy, it becomes easier to buy the ’migration ticket’ -
BC, as it is less costly to acquire education and then migrate.
The LDC government could improve the efficiency of the skill subsidy by targeting
the subsidy toward those skilled workers, e.g. through employer that do not migrate.
Assume that the same subsidy would be granted to companies in LDC to decrease skilled
labour costs. Because of a higher labour demand, the wage rate for the skilled labour
would increase. A higher domestic wage would imply that less skilled workers would
have incentives to emigrate. As a result, migration would decrease, whereas the stock of
the skilled labour in LDC would increase because of a higher wage.
Comparing the two types of skill subsidies (direct and indirect) suggests that the skill
subsidy to firms is a more efficient policy than paying it directly to skilled workers: (i)
there would more skilled workers in LDC, (ii) less skilled workers would emigrate, and
(iii) budgetary costs would be lower. The indirect skill subsidy is more efficient, because
it is better targeted than the direct skill subsidy. The main disadvantage of the direct skill
subsidy is that it also supports those workers that would emigrate. In other words, it
helps them to buy the ’migration ticket’ - BC.10 A subsidy granted to the skilled labour
would increase the stock of the skilled labour only indirectly, through the international
wage effect for the skilled labour. If LDC is sufficiently small, then the skill subsidy
would have no effect on the stock of the skilled labour in LDC.
3.3. Education subsidy
As discussed above, the worker education decision is determined by a trade-off
between the wage difference between the skilled and unskilled work (skill premium) and
the cost of education. Thus, in addition to increasing the skill premium, the demand
for education can be increased also by reducing the cost of education, for example,
by investing in the public education, or by subsidising education through government
scholarships (Heckman 2000; Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Fender and Wang 2003).
The effect of the direct education subsidy would be similar to the direct skill subsidy. As
above, the stock of the skilled labour would increase only because of the indirect wage
effect. A higher supply of the skilled workforce would exert a downward pressure on the
skilled labour wage, which would decrease. If the skilled wage rate would not change,
then the stock of the skilled labour would remain the same. Therefore, this policy would
be ineffective in terms of increasing the LDC’s human capital. In addition, the direct
10Note that high skills is a precondition for the eligibility of the EU Blue Card.
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education subsidy would also increase emigration. The stock of the skilled labour in LDC
would depend only on the skilled wage effect in EU, but not on the education policy
directly.
The effectiveness of the education subsidy could be improved by conditioning the
education subsidy on the post-education employment in LDC that provides education.
The conditional education subsidy has been implemented in several LDC and has proven
to be an efficient way of increasing the stock of the human capital (Lowell and Findlay
2001). Under the conditional education subsidy, all skilled workers would stay in LDC
and there would be no migration.
Alternatively, the LDC government could implement the education subsidy through
employer (similarly to skill subsidy). The support for education at the firm level (indirect
education subsidy) would increase the demand for the skilled labour. A higher demand for
the skilled labour would exert an upward pressure on the skilled labour wage. Because of
a higher skill premium, the stock of the skilled labour in LDC would increase. Hence, the
indirect education subsidy would be more efficient than a policy addressing education
through the labour market supply side (direct education subsidy) for three reasons: (i)
a higher stock of skilled labour, (ii) a lower migration, and (iii) lower budgetary costs.
Thus, by supporting the education at the firm level (addressing the demand side of the
labour market), policy would be better targeted and hence more efficient.
If invested in education, high-skill worker remittances from EU could increase the
equilibrium education in LDC (see section 2.1). Hence, by increasing incentives for
investing remittances into education, e.g. by introducing a tax relief for remittances or
reducing remittance transfer costs, the LDC government could increase education.11 For
example, a tax relief for remittances would increase the purchasing power of remittances
in LDC and hence the incentives to remit. Alternatively, the share of remittances invested
in education could be increased by introducing a distortionary taxation to remittances
spent on consumption goods and/or tax exemptions to remittances spent on investment
goods. Because the purchasing power of remittances for consumption goods would
decrease compared to investment goods, more remittances would be invested. If invested
in education, the size of the skilled work force would increase in LDC in the medium-
to long-run. As above, the efficiency of the education remittance tax relief could be
improved by granting the tax relief only for those skilled workers that remain in LDC,
because part of newly educated workers would emigrate.
11In most developing countries remittances are subject to income tax (Chami et al. 2003).
12
3.4. R&D and innovation policies
As explained in section 2.3, the high-skill migration would affect not only the human
capital but also the knowledge production/absorption in LDC. Hence, in addition to
coping with BC-caused losses in the human capital, the LDC government also needs
to deal with a decreasing knowledge stock (which not only reduces growth, but also
co-determines the skilled labour migration). The two main options for increasing the
knowledge stock are investing in R&D for generating new ideas (subsidising the produc-
tion of a new knowledge), or in the adoption of the foreign knowledge (subsidising the
adoption of the foreign knowledge).
The knowledge adoption subsidy could be implemented in two ways: co-financing the
cost of the knowledge adoption or subsidising the demand for knowledge. First, consider
a policy that would co-finance the cost of the knowledge adoption. Assume that the
LDC government would pay a knowledge subsidy per unit of the adopted knowledge.
The knowledge adoption subsidy would reduce the marginal costs of the knowledge
adoption, which would increase the LDC’s equilibrium knowledge adoption.
Another option for LDC would be to subsidise the production of new knowledge.
Assume that the LDC’s government would pay subsidy to reduce the cost of the new
knowledge creation. The knowledge production subsidy would reduce the marginal cost
of the knowledge creation. In this case, the knowledge production subsidy would not
affect the equilibrium level of knowledge in LDC, in the presence of BC the knowledge
stock would stay unchanged both with and without subsidy. The knowledge production
subsidy would only change the equilibrium distribution between the new knowledge
and adopted knowledge: it would increase the knowledge production and decrease the
knowledge adoption.
These results suggest that, as long as the international knowledge gap between LDC
and EU would be positive, subsidising the creation of new knowledge would be less
efficient than subsidising the adoption of already invented knowledge somewhere else.
For example, for LDC it would be less expensive to adopt the EU knowledge than to
produce its own knowledge. As a result, subsidising the production of new knowledge
would only offset the cost disadvantage of the new knowledge production compared to
the knowledge adoption and lead to a zero (or small) increase in the total knowledge
stock in LDC.
On the other hand, the reallocation of subsidies between the adoption of the foreign
knowledge and the production of new knowledge would also affect the skilled labour
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migration, at least in the long-run. Investing in R&D would increase the productivity
of both the skilled and unskilled labour. However, because the efficiency of subsidies
invested in the new knowledge production would be lower than the efficiency of subsidies
invested in the knowledge adoption, the increase in the labour productivity would be
higher with the latter than with the former policy. Reallocating subsidies from the
knowledge production to the foreign knowledge adoption would increase the knowledge
capital stronger and hence the labour productivity in LDC would increase more.
In summary, the efficiency of the knowledge adoption subsidy would be higher than
that of the knowledge production subsidy. The latter would increase the knowledge
capital more and hence the labour productivity. A higher labour productivity would
increase the skilled labour in LDC and reduce the skilled migration more effectively than
the knowledge production subsidy.
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations
In May 2009 the EU adopted the Blue Card Directive, which should facilitate the
entry, employment, and residence of highly skilled third country workers in EU. The first
implementation report on the EU Blue Card concluded by the European Commission after
the first five years revealed a number of deficiencies. In order to address the identified
shortcomings of the EU Blue Card, in June 2016 the European Commission issued a new
EU Blue Card proposal. This revised proposal is meant to make the EU Blue Card more
attractive for highly qualified workers from third countries and increase the inflows of
skilled workers.
While certainly strengthening the knowledge-based economy of the EU, the potential
impacts of the new Blue Card proposal on less developed sending countries raise many
questions. For example, what will be the long-term impacts of the new EU Blue Card
proposal on the knowledge-based capital and economic growth in sending countries?
What are possible policy actions to tackle challenges and utilise opportunities associated
with the new EU Blue Card proposal to ensure a win-win situation for both receiving
and sending countries?
Although, there is a growing body of literature studying the potential implications of
the EU Blue Card scheme on receiving countries, Blue Card impacts on less developed
sending countries have been studied much less. The main objective of the present study
is to fill this research gap by assessing the potential impacts of the new EU Blue Card
proposal on the knowledge-based capital – a key source of the economic growth – in
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less developed sending countries and, based on gained insights, to identify and examine
appropriate policy instruments for dealing with potential challenges and opportunities
triggered by the EU Blue Card.
Given that the knowledge-based capital is one of the main sources of the economic
growth, which in turn depends importantly on the size of the skilled workforce in
country, in this study we analyse how the EU Blue Card might affect the key ingredients
of the knowledge-based capital in sending countries. In particular, we focus on the
human capital and knowledge stock, as in the previous literature they are identified as
key components of the knowledge-based capital. Whereas the former is determined by
investment into human capital e.g. through education and by the international labour
migration, the latter depends on the investment into R&D and innovation and on the
diffusion and absorption of ideas and knowledge generated somewhere else.
In line with previous literature on the international labour migration, our results
suggest that the EU Blue Card may reduce the knowledge-based capital and hence the
economic growth in LDC, if not accompanied by appropriate policy measures. The EU
Blue Card may have a negative impact on both analysed components of the knowledge-
based capital: the human capital and knowledge stock. In light of potential challenges
for less developed countries, we identify and examine a number of alternative policy
instruments for LDC.
Our findings suggest that those policies that address the supply side of the skilled
labour market (e.g., direct education subsidy, direct skill subsidy) would be the least
efficient. This is especially the case when LDC is small relative to EU, as such policies
would enhance migration, but they do not have a direct impact on the skilled labour
stock in LDC. Only if LDC is large enough compared to EU, supply side policies may
increase the stock of the skilled labour in LDC, as the skilled migration would decrease
the international wage rate for the skilled labour. This indirect wage effect would increase
the stock of the skilled labour in LDC – because of a lower wage rate, less skilled workers
would have incentives to migrate. If, however, LDC is small, there would be no wage
effect and the stock of the skilled labour in LDC would not be affected by direct subsidies
at all. The key issue of policies that address the supply side of the skilled labour market
is that these policies cannot distinguish between the skilled labour that emigrates and
the skilled labour that stays. Being targeted at both potential migrants and non-migrants,
they would help also potential migrants to acquire the ’skill migration ticket’ - the EU
Blue Card.
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The efficiency of labour market policies in LDC would be improved through a better
targeting: (i) directly targeting the demand side of the skilled labour market (e.g. through a
skill subsidy granted to firms, or subsidising education at the firm level); or (ii) specifically
targeting migrant workers (e.g. through the Bhagwati tax, conditional education subsidy).
Whereas the former would change incentives only of those who stay, the latter would
do the reverse - it would change incentives of those that would migrate. In terms
of the implementation feasibility, policies addressing the demand side of the skilled
labour market appear to be less costly. The enforcement costs of policies which would
address only migrants would be higher and may require an international cooperation
with receiving countries.
Turning to limitations, we would like to remind that in the present study we consid-
ered only selected sources of the knowledge-based capital growth – the human capital
and knowledge stock – and only selected channels through which the revised EU Blue
Card may affect the less developed sending country growth in the long-run: education,
migration, R&D and innovation and knowledge spillovers. Although, we hope that we
have captured all main sources of growth and channels of the knowledge-based capital
adjustment, in reality there are many more. Analysing all of them however is beyond the
scope of the present study, but is a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix
1. Conceptual framework
Given that the knowledge-based capital is one of the main sources of the economic
growth (Andrews and Criscuolo 2013), which in turn depends importantly on the size of
the skilled workforce in country (De la Fuente and Ciccone 2002), in this study we focus
on the human capital and knowledge stock in less developed sending countries, as in the
previous literature they are identified as key components of the knowledge-based capital
(OECD 2013). Whereas the former is determined by investment into human capital e.g.
through education and by the international labour migration, the latter depends on the
investment into R&D and innovation and on the diffusion and absorption of ideas and
knowledge generated somewhere else. In this Appendix we provide a diagrammatic
analysis that supports the findings presented in the paper.
1.1. Human capital
Assume that the sending country, S, is endowed with LS
(
= λH LSH + λU L
S
U
)
units of
labour, which is shown on the horizontal axis in the left panel of Figure 1.1 The skilled
labour, LSH, is measured from left to right, whereas the unskilled labour, L
S
U, from right
to left. Curves DSH and D
S
U represent the demand for the skilled and unskilled labour,
respectively, and SSH is the supply of the skilled labour in S. λH and λU are efficiency
parameters measuring the relative labour productivity of skilled and unskilled workers,
respectively (see Figure 1).
Abstracting from other channels of the labour market adjustment, such as employment
and participation decisions, assume that workers decide on two issues: education and
migration. First, consider the education decision, where workers have to choose between
offering an unskilled labour versus investing into education and offering a skilled labour.
According to Averett and Burton (1996), the education decision is determined by a trade-
off between the skill premium (difference between the skilled wage, wSH, and the unskilled
wage, wSU), the cost of education, EC
S, and the stock of knowledge, KS. These costs
capture both the direct costs of education, such as tuition fees, as well as indirect costs,
such as worker opportunity costs and the education effort (which is different across
individuals).
1For the sake of graphical tractability of the diagrammatic analysis, we make several simplifying
assumptions. First, we assume that there are only two countries (one less developed country (LDC) and
one more developed (EU)), and two types of skills (low-skill and high-skill). Second, we consider only
two channels of labour market adjustment (education and migration), whereas we abstract from two other
important channels (participation and employment). Third, we assume that the demand of low-skill labour
is infinitely elastic. If the elasticity of low-skill labour demand would be partially elastic, then there would
be additional low-skill wage effect, which would affect the ratio of high-skill/low-skill workers in LDR.
However, this is for illustrative purposes only to more transparently show the main drivers of high-skill
labour adjustments. Moreover, it can be easily verified that, as long as the condition LLDRH /L
LDR
L ≤ LmH/LmL
holds, the results with low-skill labour migration would be qualitatively equal to those presented here.
1
Given that education is costly, workers invest into education only when education
would increase their net income.2 Thus, net of education costs, workers must earn at least
the unskilled wage, which is equal to wS∗U . The vertical difference between the skilled
labour supply, SSH, and the unskilled wage rate, w
S∗
U , represents the cost of education
(Figure 1, left panel). It’s slope is increasing, because workers are not equally talented,
they are heterogeneous in their ability to acquire skills through education (Cameron and
Heckman 1998). In line with Willis and Rosen (1979), the last skilled worker, who enters
education at LS∗H is just able to compensate education costs, his skill premium is equal
to zero. Assuming a full employment, the rest of workers, LS − LSH, are unskilled. The
equilibrium wage of unskilled workers without migration, wS∗U , is at the point where the
demand for the unskilled labour, DSU, intersects the vertical line at L
S∗
H . The equilibrium
stock of the skilled labour is LS∗H and the skilled labour wage rate is w
S∗
H . In equilibrium,
the education cost of the marginal worker who enters education is equal to EC∗. The
equilibrium for the receiving country, R, is analogous. In the absence of migration, the
equilibrium skilled wage, the unskilled wage and the stock of the skilled labour are wR∗H ,
wR∗U , and L
R∗
H , respectively (Figure 1, right panel).
Second, lets consider the skilled worker decision where to offer their work, at home
or abroad, which determines the short-run equilibrium with migration. According to
Sjaastad (1962), the trade-off which workers face here is given by the expected income
increase through migration versus migration costs, MC. These costs include not only the
direct transportation costs to the destination country, but also the employment uncertainty
(which is higher abroad than at home), social costs of leaving family and/or friends
behind, cultural adjustment costs, language barriers etc. (Straubhaar 1986). Workers
migrate, LmH, if the expected net benefits arising from migration are higher than migration
costs, MC.3
Assume that, due to cross-country differences in the knowledge stock, KR > KS,
the receiving country, R, is more developed than the sending country, S. Differences
in country development and hence wage levels trigger migration from S to R. In the
presence of positive migration costs, MC > 0, the net wage which migrant workers earn
is lower than the skilled incumbent wage in R, because the net wage of migrants is the
skilled wage in destination country, wRH, minus migration costs, MC.
According to the migration network theory and the empirical evidence (Carrington,
Detriagiache and Vishwanath 1996), migration costs are not constant, they decrease in the
number of migrants from S residing in R. In Figure 1 (middle panel) these network
effects are captured by a decreasing distance between curves SmMC and S
m. Curve Sm
is the migrant work supply on the international labour market, which is derived by
2We implicitly assume that all workers, for whom it pays off to become skilled, invest in education.
3We recognise that in reality the migration decision of workers is driven not only by wage differences
but also by non-economic considerations. However, in the present study we abstract from all other
determinants of migration and consider cross-country wages differences as the only force driving labour
migration.
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3
subtracting the skilled labour supply, SSH, from the skilled labour demand, D
S
H, in S.
Curve SmMC represents the migrant supply adjusted by migration costs, MC.
In equilibrium, LmH skilled workers migrate from S to R incurring migration cost, MC
∗,
and receive the net wage, wmH
(
= wR∗Ho − MC∗
)
. The equilibrium wage rate of the skilled
labour, wR∗Ho, is determined by the intersection of the migration supply, S
m
MC, and the
migration demand, Dm (Figure 1, middle panel). The migration demand, Dm, is derived
by subtracting the skilled labour demand, DRH, from supply, S
R
H (right panel in Figure 1).
Immigration reduces the skilled wage in R from wR∗H (skilled equilibrium wage without
migration) to wR∗Ho (skilled equilibrium wage with migration). The magnitude of the wage
effect depends on the sending country S’s relative size - the larger is S relative to R, the
bigger is the wage effect in R. In contrast, if S is sufficiently small, then migration does
not affect the wage rate in R at all. This would be the case if S faces a perfectly elastic
skilled labour demand in R, such as DRH1 (Figure 1, right panel). In this case, the skilled
labour wage in R is equal to wR∗Ho both with and without migration, and migration is
equal to LmH.
Workers from S migrate to R as long as wR∗H − MC∗ > wS∗H . The mass of skilled
workers that emigrate, LSmH − LSnH , is determined by the slope of the migrant work supply
curve, SmMC. Due to emigration, the stock of the skilled and unskilled work force in S
decreases from LS∗H to L
Sn
Ho, and from L
S − LS∗H to LS − LSmH , respectively. Given that the
stock of skilled workers decreases relatively more than that of unskilled, the return to
education increases. As a result, the equilibrium mass of workers who acquire education
increases from LS∗H to L
Sm
Ho , with L
S∗
H < L
Sm
Ho .
4
1.2. Knowledge stock
According to OECD (2013), the knowledge available in the sending country, S, is
determined by the domestic knowledge production and foreign knowledge spillovers. The
knowledge creation involves the production of new knowledge, whereas the knowledge
adoption is an uptake of the knowledge developed in other countries (though both are
costly). In order to increase the stock of knowledge, the sending country, S, can invest in
the knowledge production (new knowledge) or in the adoption of knowledge available
though spillovers from R (adopted knowledge).
The level of knowledge available in S is determined by the total (private and public)
expenditure on knowledge, TRS, and the skilled workforce, LSH. Knowledge, K
S, increases
in both the R&D expenditure, TRS, and the human capital, LSH, which increases the
productivity of knowledge.
In the absence of knowledge flows between countries, the only source of country
S’s knowledge improvement is innovation through investment into R&D. The autarky
4Note that in Figure 1 we assumed that only skilled workers have the migration option. Abstracting
from unskilled worker migration is motivated by the focus of our study – the EU Blue Card, which targets
solely high-skill workers. Moreover, it can be easily verified that, as long as the condition LSH/L
S
U ≤ LmH/LmU
holds, the results with unskilled labour migration would be qualitatively equal to those presented here.
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equilibrium knowledge in S is shown in the upper panel of Figure 2, where the horizontal
axis measures the level of knowledge, KS, and the vertical axes measures units of the
expenditure spent on the knowledge accumulation, trS(= TRS/KS). We assume that
the marginal cost of the knowledge creation, MCSC, is increasing in the technological
development, whereas the marginal productivity (benefit) of the knowledge demand,
MBS, is decreasing in the technological development (both new and adopted knowledge).
This is represented by upward and downward sloping marginal cost and productivity
curves, MCS, and MBS, respectively (upper panel in Figure 2). In the absence of in-
ternational knowledge flows, the equilibrium domestic innovation, KS∗C , is at the point
where marginal costs of the knowledge creation, MCSC, equal the marginal productiv-
ity of knowledge, MBS. The equilibrium innovation, KS∗C , implies tr
S∗ units of R&D
expenditure.
Analogously, the knowledge equilibrium for the receiving country, R, is shown in the
bottom panel of Figure 2. The intersection between the receiving country, R’s, marginal
cost of the knowledge creation, MCRC , and the marginal productivity of knowledge, MB
R,
yields the equilibrium domestic innovation and per one unit of expenditure, KR∗C and
trR∗, respectively.
Next, consider integration between S and R, which triggers international knowledge
flows. Assuming higher skilled/unskilled labour force ratio in R than in S implies
a higher equilibrium knowledge in R, (KR∗C > K
S∗
C ). As shown in Figure 2, in an
open economy equilibrium, more knowledge available in R allows S to adopt inward
knowledge spillovers from the more developed country, R. The maximum level of the
knowledge spillover that can be adopted in S is equal to the R’s equilibrium knowledge
production, KR∗C . On the other hand, in a two country world, R cannot benefit from
knowledge spillovers from S, because the technological development in S is lower than
in R.
We assume that S’s marginal costs of the knowledge adoption are constant, given
along the horizontal line MCSA, which implies that in the absence of knowledge flows
between countries, the equilibrium expenditure of the knowledge creation, trR∗, is higher
than the marginal cost of the knowledge adoption, MCSA < tr
R∗ in equilibrium.5,6 This
assures that, in the presence of knowledge flows between countries, the knowledge
adoption may yield positive profits. The total equilibrium knowledge in S is KmT , which
is a sum of the domestically created knowledge, KmC , and the adopted foreign knowledge,
5Note that we assume differences in marginal costs between knowledge creation and knowledge
adoption. This is consistent with previous findings in the literature. According to Mansfield (1981), on
average, imitation costs are about 65 percent of the original innovation costs. Further, we assume that
both new and adopted knowledge are homogenous in production, i.e. they do not differ with respect to
marginal productivities.
6In reality, the marginal costs of knowledge adoption may increase with additional knowledge adopted.
However the slope of the marginal costs of knowledge adoption should be lower than the marginal costs
of knowledge creation (Mansfield 1981). To simply the figures, we assume constant marginal costs of
knowledge adoption, but the results hold in general.
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KmA(= K
m
T − KmC ). Hence, In the presence of international knowledge spillovers, the
equilibrium knowledge production is lower in S, KmC < K
S∗
C (though the total knowledge
in S is higher, KmT > K
S∗
C ). Note that the knowledge equilibrium in R is not affected
by international knowledge spillovers because, due to a country development gap,
knowledge spillovers are one-directional: from the more developed country, R, to the
less developed country, S.
2. The impact of the EU Blue Card on the innovative capital in LDC
2.1. BC impact on the human capital accumulation in LDC
LDC wage effect. The effect of changes in the skilled/unskilled wage ratio on education
is shown in Figure 1. In the absence of BC, the equilibrium wage of the skilled labour is
wmH and the equilibrium wage of the unskilled labour is w
S∗
U in LDC (Figure 1, left panel).
BC reduces migration costs. To simplify the graphical exposition, we assume that BC
reduces migration costs, MC, to zero. As a result, the excess supply of the skilled labour
increases from SmMC to S
m and the equilibrium skilled labour wage in LDC increases to
wmHB, implying that the wedge between the skilled and unskilled labour wage in LDC
increases.7 The mass of LDC workers who acquire education increases from LSmH to L
Sm
HB.
Job and skill upgrading effect. The downgrading of migrant skills in EU affects the edu-
cation decision of unskilled workers in LDC. With an upward sloping labour supply and
a downward sloping labour demand, as in Figure 1, the international labour migration
equalises the skilled wage in LDC with the unskilled wage in EU (net of migration costs),
as migrant skills are downgraded in EU in the absence of BC. The equilibrium wage,
wmU, is determined by the intersection of the unskilled wage in EU, w
R∗
U , and the skilled
migrant supply, SmMC, net of migration costs vertically along S
m, yielding an equilibrium
net wage of the skilled labour in LDC, wmU. The equilibrium migration is L
m
H1.
8 BC shifts
the equilibrium skilled wage to wmHB. Under BC, there is more migration, L
m
H1 < L
m
HB,
and less skilled workers stay in LDC, LSnH1 > L
Sn
HB. On the other hand, the incentives for
acquiring education in LDC also increase, because under BC the wage rate of the skilled
labour is higher in LDC, wmU < w
m
HB, resulting in a higher share of the skilled labour
force, LSnH1 + L
m
H1 < L
Sm
HB.
Education cost effect. In Figure 1 the worker heterogeneity in terms of ability is
represented by an upward sloping skilled labour supply curve, SSH. In the absence of
BC, the share of the skilled workforce in LDC is LSmH . The upward sloping education
cost curve, SSH, in Figure 1 implies that the average cost of education under BC is higher,
wmH − wS
∗
U = EC
m < ECmB = w
m
HB − wS
∗
U , and the average net gain from schooling is lower.
7The exact magnitude of this wage ratio effect depends on the elasticity of the unskilled labour demand.
In Figure 1 the elasticity of the unskilled labour demand is assumed to be infinitely elastic implying no
unskilled wage effect.
8Note that in presence of migrant skill downgrading the stock of the skilled labour in EU is not affected
by migration from LDC.
7
Remittance effect. The effect of remittances is shown in Figure 3. Similar to Figure 1,
the equilibrium skilled wage in LDC without BC is wmH and with BC - w
m
HB. Through
migration, BC increases the worker welfare by area ab. The worker welfare increases
because of remittances (area b) and because of a higher skilled labour wage in LDC (area
a). Remittances invested in education shift the skilled labour supply from SSH to S
S
H1 and
migration from LmH to L
m
H1, with L
m
H < L
m
H1. In the same time, because of a lower skilled
labour wage, the stock of the skilled labour in LDC increases from LSnHB to L
Sn
H1, with
LSnHB < L
Sn
H1. The other possible remittance effect – a reduced labour supply is represented
by a decreasing supply of the skilled labour from SSH to S
S
H2 and migration from L
m
HB
to LmH2. As a result, the LDC’s human capital stock decreases from L
Sn
HB to L
Sn
H2, with
LSnHB > L
Sn
H2.
2.2. BC impact on the international labour migration
Brain drain effect. In Figure 3 BC increases the skilled labour migration from LmH to L
m
HB
(middle panel). In BC equilibrium, LDC has less skilled workers LSnHB, with L
Sn
HB < L
Sn
H
(left panel). Thus, because of the brain drain, BC has a strictly negative impact on the
human capital in LDC.
Wage effects. Both sending and receiving country wage effects on the international
distribution of the labour force are shown in Figure 3, where in the long-run migration
equalises the wage rate between LDC and EU. Through the skilled worker migration, BC
reduces the skilled wage in EU from wR∗Ho to w
m
H. In contrast, in LDC the skilled wage
increases from wmH to w
m
HB (Figure 3). In the long-run, the equilibrium wage rate for the
skilled labour, wmHB, is equalised across countries and migration equals to L
m
HB. Hence,
because of LDC and EU wage effects, the long-run losses of the human capital induced
by BC are lower compared to the short-run. Both wage effects depend on the relative
country size and the size of the migrating population. In Figure 3 the small LDC case
implies a perfectly elastic skilled labour demand in the EU given by DRH1. In this case,
the skilled labour wage in EU is equal to wR∗Ho, both with BC and without BC. The skilled
labour migration equals to LmH without BC and L
m
Ho with BC. Compared to migration
from a large LDC, more skilled workers emigrate, LmHo > L
m
H, implying less human capital
in LDC.
Migrant network effect. The migration decision in the presence of the migrant network
effect is shown in Figure 4, where the starting point is the equilibrium migration with
endogenous migration costs, MC, and the migrant supply curve SmMC. With constant
migration costs, MC1, skilled labour migration supply is SmMC1. For both types of
migration costs the equilibrium skilled labour wage in LDC and the skilled migration
without BC is wmH and L
m
H, respectively. Assume that BC reduces migration costs by
c. This implies that the skilled migrant labour supply with constant migration costs
shifts to SmMCB1 and the skilled migrant labour supply with endogenous migration costs
shifts to SmMCB. The skilled wage rate in LDC decreases to w
m
HB1 and w
m
HB, respectively.
This implies that with constant migration costs, MC1, the effect is weaker both on the
8
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9
skilled migration and wage than if migrant networks reduce migration costs, MC, with
LmH < L
m
HB1 < L
m
HB and w
m
H < w
m
HB1 < w
m
HB, respectively. With constant migration costs
BC leads to a smaller decline of the skilled labour force in LDC than with decreasing
migration costs, LSnH > L
Sn
HB1 > L
Sn
HB.
2.3. BC impact on R&D and innovation in LDC
Fiscal effect. The fiscal impact of BC is shown in Figure 5. Income taxes paid by skilled
and unskilled workers are tH and tU, respectively, where tH > tU. If taxes are paid as
a fixed rate of gross wages, then the absolute value of taxes paid by the skilled labour
increases under BC, tH1, because of a higher wage, tH < tH1. The total tax revenue
without BC is equal to area abcd, and to area ade with BC. Under BC, the number of
individuals who pay taxes declines by LSnH − LSnHB for the skilled labour and by LSmHB − LSmH
for the unskilled labour, which reduces tax revenues by area bc. Because the skilled labour
wage increases with migration, the tax revenue increases by area e. If area bc is larger
than area e, then the tax revenue declines, otherwise it increases with the introduction of
BC. Thus, the total fiscal impact of BC depends on the relative size of these areas, which
in turn depends on the size of the brain drain, the spillover effect, the public technical
knowledge transfer effect, the unskilled labour productivity effect and the remittance
effect.
Knowledge productivity effect. The knowledge productivity effect is shown in Figure 6
(upper panel), where a smaller skilled workforce implies a downward shift of the marginal
productivity curve from MBS to MBSB and the equilibrium knowledge decreases from K
m
T
to KmTB1. An increase in the skilled workforce in EU increases the knowledge productivity.
In Figure 6 (lower panel) a higher stock of the skilled labour increases the EU’s marginal
productivity of knowledge from MBR to MBRB and the equilibrium knowledge increases
from KR∗C to K
R∗
CB. More knowledge in EU does not affect the knowledge level in LDC,
because the LDC’s absorptive capacity is constraining the absorption of more foreign
knowledge – both with and without BC only part of the knowledge produced in EU can
be absorbed by LDC, KmT < K
R∗
C and K
m
TB1 < K
R∗
CB, respectively.
2.4. BC impact on the knowledge diffusion
Diaspora effect. The skilled worker migration facilitates the spillover of knowledge,
technology and business contacts from destination countries. In Figure 6 (upper panel)
the marginal cost of the knowledge adoption decreases from MCSA to MC
S
AB and the
equilibrium knowledge stock shifts from KmTB1 to K
m
TB.
3. Migration policy options for LDC
3.1. Migration tax
Bhagwati tax. The impact of the Bhagwati tax on the human capital in LDC is shown
in Figure 1. Presume that tax, tmH, is imposed on emigrating skilled workers (for the sake
10
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of simplicity we assume that tmH = MC
∗). The migration tax does not affect domestic
workers in LDC and EU. Instead, migration tax reduces the net skilled labour wage of
migrant workers from wmHB to w
m
H. Because of smaller net wage differences between LDC
and EU, the number of migrants decreases from LmHB to L
m
H, with L
m
HB > L
m
H and the mass
of skilled workers in LDC increases from LSnH to L
Sn
Ho, with L
Sn
H < L
Sn
Ho.
9 Note that the
skilled worker emigration and the size of the skilled labour force are reduced to their
pre-BC levels, because for the sake of simplicity we assumed that the migration tax rate
is equal to the migration cost, tmH = MC
∗.
Skill-biased labour tax. In order to simplify the diagrammatic analysis, assume that
only the unskilled labour is taxed with a tax rate equal to tU.10 A skill-biased labour tax
affects only the demand for the unskilled labour, which in Figure 7 shifts from DSU to
DSUt. The corresponding shift in the skilled labour supply is from S
S
H to S
S
Ht. The skilled
labour demand remains unaffected at DSH. The skill-biased labour tax reduces the net
wage of the unskilled labour. The incentives for education increases, resulting in a higher
skilled worker emigration. A higher emigration, in turn, decreases the skilled labour
wage. In equilibrium the wage rate for the skilled labour decreases from wmHB with BC to
wmHt under the skill-biased tax. A lower wage allows firms in LDC to hire more skilled
workers. As a result, the size of the skilled labour force in LDC increases from LSnHB to
LSnHt, with L
Sn
HB < L
Sn
Ht and emigration increases to L
m
Ht, with L
m
Ht > L
m
HB.
Next, assume that LDC is sufficiently small, such that LDC’s tax policy does not affect
the international wage rate for the skilled labour. This would be the case, for example, if
the EU’s skilled labour demand is perfectly elastic, such as DRH1 in Figure 7. The skilled
wage with BC is wR∗Ho, both with and without the skill-biased tax, and will not be affected
by the LDC’s tax policy. As a result, in both cases with and without taxation of the
unskilled labour, the stock of the skilled labour in small LDC will stay unchanged at LSnHo.
However, in the presence of BC, a skill-biased tax will increase migration from LmHo to
LmH2, which is due to a reduced after-tax wage in LDC.
3.2. Skill subsidy
Direct skill subsidy. The impact of a skill subsidy is shown in Figure 8. The initial
equilibrium emigration with BC (share of workers which emigrates without the skill
subsidy) is given by LmHB
(
= LSmHB − LSnHB
)
, the initial stock of the skilled labour by LSnHB,
and the initial wage rate by wmHB. In order to reduce the cross-country wage gap, which
drives migration, LDC grants the skill subsidy, sH. The effect of the direct skill subsidy
is shown in Figure 8, where the skill subsidy shifts the supply of the skilled labour
down from SSH to S
S
HS. The demand for the skilled labour is, however, not affected at
9If feasible, migration quota/restriction would have a similar effect to Bhagwati tax on human capital in
LDC. The only difference is that migration quota would not contribute to government budget.
10If both types of labour were taxed, then tU would represent the tax difference between skilled and
unskilled work.
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DSH. As a result, the wage rate for the skilled labour decreases from w
m
H to w
m
Hs. The
total income of the skilled labour is equal to wage plus subsidy, wmHs + sH. The size of
the skilled work force in LDC increases from LSnHB to L
Sn
Hs, with L
Sn
HB < L
Sn
Hs. Note that the
stock of the skilled labour increases only because of the indirect wage effect - the skilled
wage decreases from wmHB to w
m
Hs. As a result, firms in LDC hire more skilled workers.
However, if LDC is small enough, i.e. with a perfectly elastic skilled labour demand, DRH1,
the wage rate and LDC’s skilled labour stock stays at wR∗Ho and L
Sn
Ho, respectively, both
with and without the skill subsidy. The skilled labour migration increases from LmHB to
LmHs, with L
m
HB < L
m
Hs (and from L
m
Ho to L
m
H2, with L
m
Ho < L
m
H2 in the case of a small LDC).
Indirect skill subsidy. The effect of the indirect skill subsidy is shown in Figure 8, where
the subsidy does not affect the supply of the skilled labour, SSH, but instead shifts to the
demand for the skilled labour from DSH to D
S
Hd. Because of a higher labour demand, the
wage rate for the skilled labour increases from wmHB to w
m
Hd. A higher domestic wage
implies that less skilled workers have incentives to emigrate. As a result, migration
decreases from LmHB to L
m
Hd, with L
m
Hd < L
m
HB. In the same time, because of a higher
wage, the stock of the skilled labour in LDC increases from LSnHB to L
Sn
Hd, with L
Sn
HB < L
Sn
Hd.
Comparing the two types of skill subsidies (direct and indirect) suggests that the skill
subsidy to firms is a more efficient policy than paying it directly to skilled workers: (i)
there are more skilled workers in LDC, LSnHs < L
Sn
Hd, (ii) less skilled workers emigrate,
LmHs > L
m
Hd, and (iii) budgetary costs are lower, sH L
Sm
Hs > sH L
Sn
Hd.
3.3. Education subsidy
Direct education subsidy. The effect of the direct education subsidy is similar to the
direct skill subsidy. As above, the stock of the skilled labour increases only because of
the indirect wage effect. A higher supply of the skilled workforce exerts a downward
pressure on the skilled labour wage, which decreases. If the skilled wage rate would
not change, then the stock of the skilled labour would remain the same. Therefore, this
policy is ineffective in terms of increasing the LDC’s human capital. In addition, the
direct education subsidy also increases migration. The stock of the skilled labour in LDC
depends only on the skilled wage effect in EU, but not on the education policy directly.
The effect of the conditional education subsidy is shown in Figure 8, where the stock
of skilled workforce increases from LSnHB with BC to L
S∗
H with the conditional education
subsidy. As a result, all skilled workers stay in LDC and there is no migration.
Indirect education subsidy. In Figure 8, the support for education at the firm level
(indirect education subsidy) will shift the demand for the skilled labour up. A higher
demand for the skilled labour exerts an upward pressure on the skilled labour wage.
Because of a higher skill premium, the stock of the skilled labour in LDC increases.
Hence, the indirect education subsidy is more efficient than a policy addressing education
through the labour market supply side (direct education subsidy) for three reasons: (i) a
higher stock of skilled labour, (ii) a lower migration, and (iii) lower budgetary costs.
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Remittance effect. By increasing incentives for investing remittances into education,
the stock of skilled workers increases in LDC. This can be seen in Figure 9. Increase in
the remittance tax rate for consumption goods changes the relative price of remittances
spent on consumption and investment,11 which in turn shifts the skilled labour supply
from SSH to S
S
Hr. As a result, the stock of the skilled labour in LDC increases from L
Sn
HB to
LSnHr.
12 As above, the efficiency of the education remittance tax relief can be improved by
granting the tax relief only for those skilled workers that remain in LDC, because part of
newly educated workers emigrates (in Figure 9 the skilled labour migration increases
from LmHB to L
m
Hr).
3.4. R&D and innovation policies
Knowledge adoption subsidy. The knowledge adoption subsidy can be implemented in
two ways: co-financing the cost of the knowledge adoption or subsidising the demand
for knowledge, MBSB. Figure 10 (upper panel) shows the effect of a policy, which co-
finances the cost of the knowledge adoption. We assume that the LDC government pays
a knowledge subsidy, sK, per unit of the adopted knowledge. The knowledge adoption
subsidy reduces the marginal costs of the knowledge adoption from MCSAB to MC
S
As,
which increases the LDC’s equilibrium knowledge from KmTB with BC to K
m
Ts with sK.
Knowledge production subsidy. Another option for LDC is to subsidise the creation of a
new knowledge. Assume that the LDC’s government pays the same subsidy, sK, to reduce
the cost of the new knowledge creation. In Figure 10 (upper panel) this implies that the
marginal cost curve of the knowledge creation shifts from MCSC to MC
S
Cs. In this case the
knowledge production subsidy, sK, does not affect the equilibrium level of knowledge in LDC.
Hence, in the presence of BC, the knowledge stock stays unchanged at KmTB both with
and without sK. The knowledge production subsidy, sK, only changes the equilibrium
distribution between the new knowledge and adopted knowledge: it increases the
knowledge innovation from KmCB to K
m
Cs, and decreases the adopted knowledge from
KmTB − KmCB to KmTB − KmCs. Subsidising the production of new knowledge only offsets
the cost disadvantage of the new knowledge production compared to the knowledge
adoption and leads to a zero (or small) increase in the total knowledge capital in LDC.13
Investing in the R&D increases the productivity of both the skilled and the unskilled
labour. Because the efficiency of subsidies invested in the new knowledge creation is
11In most developing countries remittances are subject to income tax (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah 2003).
12Note that the stock of skilled labour increases only because of the indirect wage effect. In the case of
a small LDC country, the tax relief for remittances invested in education will not affect the LDC skilled
labour. With perfectly elastic skilled labour demand DRH1 the wage rate and LDC skilled labour stock stays
at wR∗Ho and L
Sn
Ho, respectively, both with and without the tax relief for remittances.
13Note that if marginal costs of knowledge adoption, MCSAB, is not constant but increasing in knowledge
adoption, then subsidising the creation of new knowledge will result in higher knowledge stock in equilib-
rium. However, because creation of knowledge is more expensive than adoption of foreign knowledge (i.e.
in terms of Figure 2 the slope of MCSC is higher than the slope of MC
S
AB), the result that subsidising the
creation of new knowledge is less efficient than subsidising the adoption of knowledge holds in general.
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Figure 10: The impact of the knowledge creation and knowledge adoption subsidies
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lower than the efficiency of subsidies invested in the knowledge adoption, the increase in
labour productivity is higher with the latter than with the former policy. These effects
are shown in Figure 11. Investing in the production of new knowledge increases the
skilled labour demand from DSH to D
S
H1 and the unskilled labour demand from D
S
U to
DSU1 (Figure 11, left panel).
14 Due to the increase in the unskilled labour wage, the
skilled labour supply increases from SSH to S
S
H1. Because of a smaller wage gap between
EU and LDC, the stock of the skilled labour in LDC increases from LSnHB to L
Sn
H1 , with
LSnHB < L
Sn
H1, and the migration of skilled workers decreases to L
m
H1 , with L
m
HB > L
m
H1.
As shown in Figure 10, reallocating subsidies from the knowledge production to the
foreign knowledge adoption, the knowledge capital increases stronger and hence the
labour productivity in LDC increases more. In Figure 11, a higher productivity shifts the
labour demand upwards from DSH to D
S
H2 for the skilled labour and from D
S
U to D
S
U2 for
the unskilled labour, respectively. The skilled labour supply shifts up from SSH to S
S
H2,
whereas migration decreases to LmH2 , with L
m
HB > L
m
H1 > L
m
H2. The stock of the skilled
labour in LDC increases to LSnH2 , with L
Sn
H2 > L
Sn
H1 > L
Sn
HB.
4. Limitations
Turning to the limitations, we recognise that a number of assumptions, that were
necessary for the conceptual analysis, may prevent from the generalisation of our results.
For example, for the sake of the graphical tractability, we had to assume that there are
only two countries (one less developed country (LDC) and one more developed (EU)),
and only two types of skills (unskilled and skilled). Introducing more countries & skill
levels could add the intensive margin to the analysis. In addition to deciding whether to
invest into education and become skilled and whether to migrate, workers could also
decide about how much to invest into education and to which country to migrate. The
underlying intuition, however, would not change.
Second, the labour economics theory (see for example Agenor 1996) suggests that
labour markets can adjust in response to macro-economic and policy shocks through
many different channels: changes in unemployment; changes in the labour force par-
ticipation; changes in the worker remuneration; the labour migration; and others. In
the present study we consider only three channels of labour market adjustments (wage,
education and migration), whereas we abstract from other important channels, such
as the labour demand, participation and employment, which are captured in general
equilibrium models.
Third, in the diagrammatic analysis, we assume that the demand for the unskilled
labour is infinitely elastic. If the elasticity of the unskilled labour demand would be
partially elastic, then there would be an additional unskilled wage effect, which would
14Here we assume that subsidies invested in new knowledge creation increase knowledge stock in LDC.
This holds when marginal costs of knowledge adoption, MCSAB, are increasing in knowledge adoption.
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affect the ratio of skilled/unskilled workers in LDR. However, the presented diagrammatic
analysis serves for illustrative purposes only, to more transparently show the main drivers
of skilled labour adjustments. Moreover, it can be easily verified that, as long as the
skilled/inskilled ratio in higher in EU than in LDC, the results with the unskilled labour
migration would be qualitatively equal to those presented in this study.
Fourth, we recognise that in reality the migration decision of workers is driven
not only by wage and employment probability differences, but also by many different
non-economic considerations, such as social ties, location preferences, etc. In addition,
migration costs include not only direct transportation costs to the destination country,
but also the employment uncertainty (which is higher abroad than at home), social costs
of leaving family and/or friends behind, cultural adjustment costs, language barriers
etc (Straubhaar 1986). For the sake of the graphical tractability, in the present study we
abstract from all other determinants of migration and consider only cross-country wages
differences as the sole force driving the labour migration.
Fifth, for the sake of the graphical tractability of the diagrammatic analysis, additional
simplifying assumptions are introduced regarding the public costs of education, the
temporary migration of skilled workers, which may facilitate the diffusion of knowledge
between more developed and less developed countries, adjustments in the labour demand
to changes in the labour supply and wages – they all are neglected in the present study
(see e.g. Jonkers and Cruz-Castro (2013), for benefits from return migration). In order to
consider all key determinants of labour market outcomes, the use of general equilibrium
models is required.
Sixth, in the present study we assume differences in marginal costs between the
knowledge creation and the knowledge adoption. This is consistent with previous
findings in the literature. According to Mansfield (1981), on average, imitation costs
are about 65 percent of the original innovation costs. Further, we assume that both the
new and adopted knowledge are homogenous in production, i.e. they do not differ
with respect to marginal productivities. In reality, however, the marginal costs of the
knowledge adoption may increase with the additional knowledge adopted. Hence, the
slope of the marginal costs of the knowledge adoption should be lower than the marginal
costs of the knowledge creation (Mansfield 1981). For the sake of the graphical tractability
of the diagrammatic analysis, we assume constant marginal costs of the knowledge
adoption, though the results hold in general.
Further, we acknowledge that the human capital accumulation does not stop at
the formal education, nor does the knowledge accumulation stop at R&D activities.
For example, the knowledge-based capital can increase, if migrants are employed in
conducive environments. Analogously, the social capital dimension of the knowledge
production is not considered in the present analysis, as it would be rather difficult to
incorporate it into a diagrammatic framework.
Finally, in the context of international labour migration policies, there are important
policy implementation constraints: (i) government budget, (ii) political support, and (iii)
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country openness, and others. First, if there would be no restrictions to the government
expenditure, then through wage subsidies the LDC’s government could straightforwardly
increase the wage rate up to the EU level, and there would be no economically-driven
migration either with or without BC. Second, if staying at power would not be a gov-
ernment objective, then it could infinitely increase the tax rate for the unskilled labour,
decrease for the skilled labour and achieve similar results. Third, if restricting the out-
ward migration would be a feasible policy option for LDC, then government could isolate
LDC from the rest of the world, and there would be no international labour migration in
autarky. Although, all three policy scenarios are unrealistic and hence infeasible, in the
diagrammatic analysis presented in this study we are not able to account for these issues.
To summarise, although accounting for selected key aspects of the knowledge-based
capital in LDC– the human capital and knowledge stock – the presented diagrammatic
analysis cannot provide policy makers with a definite answer of potential impacts of the
revised EU Blue Card proposal on growth prospects in LDC. For such questions the use
of general equilibrium models with endogenous labour adjustments through education,
migration, participation and employment is required. Nevertheless, by identifying and
examining the key challenges of adjustments in the knowledge-based capital, our study
contributes to a better understanding of challenges potentially arising from the EU Blue
Card in LDC and available policy opportunities.
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